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mAbstract: This paper examines employment-focused interventions within the US
disability system. Our review illustrates the challenges of developing and
implementing these types of initiatives, despite substantial policy interest. Our
findings indicate that none of the demonstrations we reviewed have the potential to
lead to substantial caseload reductions that could reverse program growth. However,
they can inform future designs, particularly the importance of customizing supports
to very well-defined target populations.
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Over the past 30 years, there have been a growing number of interventions designed
to promote employment among people with disabilities, particularly those receiving
public cash benefits and other supports. In part, this interest reflects a desire by
policymakers to stem the large caseload increases in programs that provide cash sup-
ports to people with disabilities, such as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). However, it also reflects a broader policy
objective to integrate people with disabilities into all aspects of society.
Identifying approaches that can produce substantial reductions in caseload growth
has been a difficult task. Employment interventions must help people with disabilities
overcome substantial employment barriers—such as loss of human capital resulting
from disability and prolonged separation from the workforce—and disincentives, in-
cluding the loss of disability benefits at only modest earnings levels. For instance, eligi-
bility criteria for SSDI and SSI require that applicants demonstrate an inability to work
above a certain earnings threshold before applying for benefits, and once on benefits,
ongoing eligibility is contingent on maintaining very low earnings levels as well as
continuing to have a disabling medical condition. In addition to the challenges experi-
enced by beneficiaries, the structure of the United States’ disability system acts as a
potential barrier to reform. Several different types of supports exist for people with
disabilities, but the supports are administered by different federal, state, and, in some
cases, local entities. The implication is that most employment initiatives modify the
parameters of one agency’s disability support program rather than modifying supports
across multiple programs or assisting people with disabilities before they request
cash or other types of supports, such as health insurance.2013 Wittenburg et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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of employment-focused interventions targeting people with disabilities. We focus on
interventions where there is a rigorous evaluation design and estimated impacts on em-
ployment outcomes. We include several demonstrations funded by the Social Security
Administration (SSA) as well as other federal agencies, including the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Adminis-
tration (SAMHSA). In reviewing these initiatives, we summarize the key evaluation find-
ings and identify lessons for designing interventions for people with disabilities.
Our findings indicate that none of the demonstrations we reviewed have the potential
to lead to substantial caseload reductions that could reverse program growth. We do
find, however, that some intensive interventions targeted at specific populations showed
positive employment impacts. The interventions that demonstrated the most promising
effects tended to provide customized supports to more narrowly targeted subgroups,
particularly younger persons and those with psychiatric impairments. Our findings also
highlight the challenges that federal agencies face in developing broad employment
initiatives, which have likely limited the interventions’ effects. There are substantive
lessons to be learned from all demonstrations—including those that failed to have large
impacts on employment. In particular, a number of demonstrations have shown the
importance of starting with smaller pilots before full-scale implementation of a larger
policy initiative.
We begin this paper by providing contextual information about the challenges in de-
veloping employment initiatives within the existing system of publicly provided disabil-
ity supports. We then describe the findings from rigorous evaluations of employment
interventions that have been tested over the past several decades and some ongoing
innovative demonstration projects that are currently in the field. We conclude with a
summary and discuss what lessons the existing evidence base offers.Challenges to developing employment initiatives
The United States has a complex network of public disability support programs that pro-
vide cash, health care, rehabilitation, and employment supports to people with disabilities.
These programs were created at different points in history—most at least 35 years ago—
and have various state and federal agencies that oversee their administration. As a result,
there is no single agency that provides a universal set of supports to people with disabil-
ities. Rather, multiple programs exist, each with its own administrative structure, funding
stream, and eligibility requirements. As we describe below in greater detail, the program
eligibility rules and fragmented support system create barriers for program participants
seeking employment as well as for agencies wanting to develop initiatives that address the
multiple employment barriers faced by those with disabilities.Disability supports emphasize income maintenance and health supports
Stapleton and Livermore (2011) document that in 2008, federal and selected state
program spending for working-age people with disabilities totaled $429 billion dollars,
with over 95 percent of these expenditures devoted to income support and health care.
The primary programs providing these benefits are SSDI, SSI, Medicare, and Medicaid.
The SSI and SSDI programs, both administered by SSA, are the two largest cash transfer
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gram designed to replace a portion of lost income for workers with disabilities and their
dependents. The SSI program is an income-maintenance program for low-income adults
and children who meet certain income and asset criteria. Both programs have experienced
substantial caseload growth in recent years. From 1980 to 2010, the number of SSDI
beneficiaries more than doubled and the number of SSI recipients tripled (Social
Security Advisory Board 2012). In 2011, there were 11.7 million SSDI beneficiaries and
9.3 million disabled SSI beneficiaries (Social Security Administration 2012).
Most SSDI and SSI beneficiaries qualify for Medicare and Medicaid, respectively.
Although there are eligibility and health coverage differences between Medicare and
Medicaid, both offset potentially expensive medical care costs and therefore may be
more valuable to people with disabilities than the SSDI and SSI cash benefits. SSI bene-
ficiaries (in most states) are categorically eligible for Medicaid, and SSDI beneficiaries
become eligible for Medicare after a two-year waiting period following SSDI eligibility.1
As will be discussed in more detail below, the combined value of the cash and health
supports are large, and the fear of losing those supports through excess earnings might
substantially limit interest in employment activities among SSDI and SSI beneficiaries.
Employment and rehabilitation supports are not as well funded as income and health
care supports. Stapleton and Livermore (2011) estimate that just over 1 percent of all
federal and state outlays in 2008 were for employment supports for working-age people
with disabilities. State Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) programs provide the largest
source of support for rehabilitation and employment services. The target population
for VR services generally includes any individual who has a work limitation and who
can benefit from VR services to achieve an employment outcome. VR’s ability to provide
services to all eligible people with disabilities is often limited by funding availability;
however, service priority is given to people with the most significant disabilities, such
as those who receive SSDI and SSI benefits.2SSA Disability program participants face many barriers to returning to work
A major challenge in developing effective employment interventions for people with
disabilities is SSA’s requirement that disability support applicants and beneficiaries have
conditions that prohibit their ability to make meaningful contributions to their own
support through work. Specifically, SSDI and SSI initial and ongoing eligibility criteria
require that eligible applicants have a medically determinable disability expected to last
at least 12 months or result in death and be unable to engage in substantial gainful ac-
tivity (SGA). In 2013, SGA is defined as the ability to earn at least $1,010 per month in
unsubsidized employment for non-blind beneficiaries ($1,690 for blind beneficiaries).
The process of establishing eligibility has important implications for future employ-
ment efforts given that the process to establish eligibility for SSDI and SSI is lengthy.
During this time period, applicants may be out of the workforce for several months to
several years. For example, according to the Social Security Advisory Board (2012), ini-
tial disability determinations take an average of 120 days. However, most initial deter-
minations are rejected, and substantial portions of these determinations are appealed,
which can further lengthen the application process for benefits for up to several years.
Some have noted that the rules for ongoing disability income support eligibility create a
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to work (Stapleton et al. 2006). Specifically, Stapleton et al. (2006) note that beneficiaries
often feel dependent on these programs and fearful of engaging in work activity, while
program administrators and the rehabilitation providers who provide employment sup-
ports to these populations often view beneficiaries as incapable of working at substantial
levels. Although both SSDI and SSI include modest employment incentives that allow
beneficiaries to retain some earnings, the amount is not enough to help beneficiaries rise
out of poverty. For the large number of SSA disability beneficiaries who are automatically
eligible for and enrolled in other income-based support services such as food and housing
assistance, the decision to work could also jeopardize their eligibility for other important
benefits.Challenges to designing employment interventions
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2005a) found substantial
fragmentation of supports across multiple programs and agencies, which created major
inefficiencies in service delivery and perverse incentives in promoting outcomes such
as employment. Over 21 federal agencies and about 190 programs provide assistance to
people with disabilities, including cash, health, rehabilitation, employment, and other
supports. Approximately half of these programs are dedicated specifically to serving
people with disabilities, whereas the remaining programs are available to those with and
without disabilities. In addition, more than 10 congressional committees have jurisdiction
over the 21 federal agencies providing supports. This fragmentation creates service
gaps, service overlaps, and sometimes conflicting objectives across programs. For
example, the GAO noted that the Department of Education and the Department of
Veteran’s Affairs have separate programs that provide vocational rehabilitation supports
to American Indians and veterans, respectively. Similar to Stapleton and Livermore
(2011), GAO (2005a) concludes that the SSA income and CMS health support
programs noted above were the system’s major cost drivers.
Combined with the employment barriers it creates, the disability support system’s
fragmentation makes it difficult to design, test, and implement even modest employment
innovations. For any intervention designed to modify supports across agencies, the spon-
soring entity must first convince every agency with relevant authority to participate and
coordinate with the test of the intervention—which can be quite difficult (Mann and
Stapleton 2012). Hence, each individual program plods along, trying to improve its part of
the overall system in ways that add up to very little overall progress. In reviewing evalua-
tions of 27 federally sponsored employment programs, policies, and initiatives conducted
since 2000, Livermore and Goodman (2009) found that many were not rigorously evalu-
ated due, in part, to their limited focus and lack of a planned evaluation framework.
An additional issue is that some programs, particularly federal-state partnerships, are
decentralized and do not have consistent metrics to measure progress across diverse
areas, which is particularly important in the provision of employment and rehabilitation
supports through state VR agencies. The United States Government Accountability Office
(2005b) criticized the Department of Education, which oversees the state VR programs,
for not having comprehensive measures to track state agency progress. Specifically, the
GAO noted that the existing measures often tracked outcomes with considerable delays,
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VR target populations and variations in other state programs that provide employment
supports.
Despite these challenges, there have been some rigorously evaluated return work
demonstrations, which we summarize by sponsoring agency.3 The first, and largest,
group includes evaluations of initiatives that have targeted volunteers who receive SSDI
and SSI benefits. The second group consists of a recently implemented intervention by
CMS to promote employment outcomes of those at risk of receiving disability benefits.
The final group includes various agency evaluations of supported employment inter-
vention programs, which are an alternative to traditional vocational supports for people
with psychiatric disabilities. The distinguishing features of all of these initiatives include
large samples, well-documented implementation, and the use of rigorous methods to
assess outcomes. Hence, the findings from these initiatives provide credible evidence
on the efficacy of approaches.
In reviewing the selected studies, we summarize the study’s goals, target population,
and impacts, then draw our own lessons for intervention design and evaluation of out-
comes. The study’s goals and target population provide important context for assessing
the impacts from each intervention, particularly given how the fragmentation in program
services and potential work disincentives described above might influence outcomes. We
then summarize the impacts from each demonstration, focusing primarily on the employ-
ment outcomes and, if applicable, effects on earnings, benefit amounts, and caseload sizes.
In some demonstrations, particularly those that focus on employment and other out-
comes, we also discuss the potential net societal benefits, which would be accounted for
in a full benefit-cost analysis (e.g., does the intervention have impacts in other areas, such
as hospitalizations, that might reduce government spending elsewhere?). To facilitate
comparisons across outcomes that span several years, we adjust earnings and benefit im-
pact estimates for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) so that all estimates re-
flect 2012 dollars. In summarizing impact findings, we identify common themes
associated with larger impacts that are related to the intervention design and target popu-
lation that can inform future intervention efforts.Social Security demonstrations
The largest evaluations of employment supports for people with disabilities have empha-
sized integrated approaches targeting people who receive SSDI and/or SSI. SSDI and SSI
beneficiaries are a natural target population for services because they represent the largest
federally funded cash transfer programs for people with disabilities, and because their use
of VR services has traditionally been limited.
In 1980, Congress authorized the SSA to test SSDI demonstration projects over a five-
year period and to test SSI demonstration projects permanently (Szymendera 2011). SSA
could use this authority to temporarily waive certain program rules and allocate trust fund
dollars and appropriated funds to finance demonstrations. The authority required that the
demonstrations have sufficient scope and scale to ensure a thorough evaluation of the
program or policy change under consideration.
The SSDI demonstration authority was renewed several times, most recently by the
Ticket to Work (TTW) and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (Ticket Act),
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major return to work program.4 Specifically, the Ticket Act established the TTW pro-
gram, a program that provides SSDI and SSI beneficiaries with a voucher, or ticket, to
purchase public or private sector employment services. One goal of the TTW program
is to expand access to and choice of rehabilitation service providers available to SSI and
SSDI beneficiaries beyond the traditional state VR services by allowing more public and
private providers to offer supports to SSDI and SSI beneficiaries. A related goal was to
develop provider incentives in a way that would tie the delivery of services to promote
substantive earnings of beneficiaries. The combination of supports attempt to align
provider and beneficiary incentives around employment. The Ticket Act also included
provisions for other types of work supports and directed SSA to conduct demonstra-
tion projects in several areas, such as administering a benefit offset work incentive to
increase the desirability of returning to work for SSDI beneficiaries. Although SSA’s
demonstration authority expired in 2005, the projects started before 2005 were allowed
to continue.
As noted in the Ticket Act, even a small increase in exit rates from SSDI and SSI
could result in large programmatic savings. The reason for the large potential savings is
because most SSDI and SSI participants receive benefits for several years and the most
likely reason for leaving the programs is either due to death or retirement. Annual exits
from SSDI and SSI due to work have generally persisted at 0.5 percent for years, even in
the face of numerous programmatic and economic changes (Berkowitz 2003, Newcomb
et al. 2003). Based on this exit rate, the Ticket Act included the following language to
motivate the rationale for employment interventions:
“If only an additional one-half of one percent of the current SSDI and SSI recipients
were to cease receiving benefits as a result of employment, the savings to the Social
Security Trust Funds and to the Treasury in cash assistance would total $3,500,000,000
over the worklife of such individuals, far exceeding the cost of providing incentives and
services needed to assist them in entering work and achieving financial independence
to the best of their abilities.”5
Below, we provide a summary of evaluations for SSA employment initiatives implemented
both before and after the Ticket Act. The pre-Ticket Act initiatives represent SSA’s early
efforts to implement demonstration projects, which proved that it was feasible to imple-
ment large-scale employment interventions using a randomized controlled trial design.
The post-Ticket Act initiatives include several that were implemented to test a wide range
of employment interventions targeting people with disabilities.
Perhaps not surprisingly given the severe impairment characteristics associated with
SSDI and SSI program eligibility and the barriers to reform described above, most SSA
employment demonstrations have struggled to recruit volunteer participants. Almost
every intervention tested targeted people for services after they had met SSA’s disability
criteria and started receiving benefits.6 Although some interventions used program
waivers, such as allowing beneficiaries to keep more of their benefits while working, in
every demonstration, participants still could lose benefits for excess work. Most of
these demonstration projects enrolled about five percent of the population targeted for
recruitment (Rangarajan et al. 2008; Ruiz-Quintanilla et al. 2005), though more recent
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impairment had higher participation rates of approximately 15 percent. As will be
discussed in more detail below, the demonstrations with narrow target populations
had customized service approaches, which likely made the services more appealing to
participants, thereby increasing volunteer rates. Regardless, all intervention target
populations represented a subgroup of all beneficiaries receiving SSDI and SSI.1. Demonstrations implemented before the Ticket Act
In Table 1, we describe four major demonstrations that were implemented prior to the
Ticket Act. The table includes a detailed summary of the evaluation design, interven-
tion components, target population, and key impact findings related to employment,
earnings, and program participation. Below, we describe each of these demonstrations
in more detail.
In 1985, SSA funded its first large-scale demonstration, the Transitional Employment
Training Demonstration (TETD). The TETD provided job placement, on-the-job train-
ing, and job retention services to eligible SSI claimants who were between ages 18 and
40, were diagnosed with an intellectual disability, and were living in one of the 13 dem-
onstration communities. The demonstration included 745 eligible claimants who
volunteered to participate. The intervention built off an earlier effort funded in 1981
called the Structured Training and Employment Transitional Services (STETS) dem-
onstration, which was funded by the Department of Labor. The STETS demonstra-
tion showed strong promise in promoting employment for a limited sample of youth
with disabilities. The TETD included a much larger sample of beneficiaries than did
STETS (745 versus 467) in 13 demonstration communities, which allowed for a more
rigorous evaluation of program impacts. The STETS study established the effective-
ness of transitional employment supports in increasing employment among youth
with disabilities (Kerachsky and Thornton 1987), and the TETD evaluation con-
firmed that these services improved employment rates and earnings (Decker and
Thornton 1995).
The evaluation of TETD found that the program had impacts on employment, earn-
ings, and benefit amounts that varied by subgroup and site (Decker and Thornton
1995). With slightly more than half employed at six years after follow-up, TETD treat-
ment group members were 9 percentage points more likely to be employed relative to
the control group. There was also a 70 percent increase in earnings over the six-year
demonstration period, representing an $8,969 (2012 dollars) total six-year increase in
earnings. There were small declines in SSI and SSDI income benefit amounts, likely
due to the increase in earnings, though the earnings increases were not substantial
enough to move treatment group members off SSI and SSDI.7 Decker and Thornton
(1995) found that the largest impacts on employment were among those with the
highest IQ scores and those who were living independently (i.e., not in a sheltered set-
ting, such as a facility).8 They also found that the sites that had the greatest impacts on
employment and earnings across several participant groups made special efforts to
tailor services to the needs of each participant. In contrast, projects that offered a more
standardized intervention either were ineffective or effective for only a subset of
participants.
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Notes: The Department of Labor funded STETS. SSA was the lead agency on all other demonstrations. Adapted from
Rangarajan et al. (2008). All dollar estimates are adjusted to the year 2012 using the Consumer Price Index, which is
available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. We only present impacts that were statistically significant from zero at the 5
percent level.
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that participant benefits might have resulted in a net societal benefit. Specifically, the
earnings gains of participants along with the likely reductions in outside service use off-
set most of the demonstration’s costs. For example, Decker and Thornton (1995) found
that the earnings gains of participating SSI recipients offset approximately 75 percent
of TETD service costs and that the shift in service use away from expensive institu-
tional supports used by control group members (“sheltered employment settings”)
could have offset the remaining TETD costs.
Project NetWork, implemented in 1991, used random assignment to evaluate an
intervention that targeted a broad base of adult SSDI and SSI beneficiaries and appli-
cants (Decker and Thornton 1995). The demonstration provided employment-focused
case management services to test the efficacy of four different case management service
models in moving people with severe disabilities into full-time employment and off the
disability rolls. Project NetWork recruited 8,428 SSI claimants and applicants and SSDI
claimants age 18 to 64 in eight sites around the country.
The findings from Project NetWork indicated initial impacts on employment that
dissipated over time and varied by intervention model intensity. Rupp and Kornfeld
(2000) found small employment impacts (approximately 2 percentage points) and an-
nual earnings impacts ($355 in 2012 dollars) in the second year of follow-up, though
the size of impacts shrank by year three. With a longer follow-up period, Rupp and Bell
(2003) found that small aggregate differences in earnings between treatment and
control groups persisted during the six years following random assignment (though the
annual difference in each individual year was not statistically significant). The relatively
small impacts might reflect that the population recruited for Project NetWork was hard
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the two years following random assignment, with annualized average earnings of
$3,495 (2012 dollars). In examining impacts by subgroups by intervention model,
Kornfeld and Rupp (2000) found that the impacts were generally smallest in the least
service intensive model that focused on providing case management services. This finding
on the potential importance of intensity and customization of services was consistent with
the subgroup findings noted above in TETD. Kornfeld and Rupp also noted that future
interventions that target certain subpopulations with more intensive, ongoing supports
might have the potential to generate larger impacts.
In 1999, SSA, in conjunction with the Department of Education, funded several projects
under the State Partnership Initiative (SPI) to encourage innovative state practices that
assist beneficiaries in reentering the workforce. These projects were evaluated using a
combination of experimental and non-experimental designs.9 To measure impacts in the
non-experimental sites, the evaluation team tested the strength of non-experimental
methods using information from the experimental site.10 However, the evaluation team
found that the non-experimental methods performed poorly in producing impact estimates
for SPI (Peikes et al. 2008, Peikes et al. 2005). As a result, the evaluation team only chose
to report findings from the four projects that used randomized controlled trial designs.11
For the four projects in three states (New Hampshire, New York, and Oklahoma) that
used an experimental design, Peikes et al. (2005) found positive impacts on employment
but no impacts on earnings. One possible explanation for the positive employment effect
but lack of earnings impacts was that beneficiaries who received benefits counseling might
have been more aware of the work disincentives through conversations with counselors
and hence, despite overall increases in employment, chose to work on a limited basis so as
to not jeopardize their benefit receipt. The authors emphasized using caution in drawing
conclusions based on these short-term effects and suggested that longer-term follow-up
data might provide a more complete picture of the interventions’ effects. However, SSA
did not conduct another follow-up study or a long-term benefit-cost analysis.
In summary, the four evaluations shown in Table 1 demonstrated to SSA the feasibility
of implementing rigorous evaluations of employment interventions. Although some of
these interventions had success in promoting employment and substantially improving
participant outcomes, none demonstrated an ability to reduce SSA benefits or caseloads.
Even TETD, the demonstration with the largest impacts on earnings, showed only small
reductions in benefits amounts. In general, the interventions with the largest employment
and earnings impacts provided customized supports to narrower target populations, par-
ticularly younger populations. In reviewing the limited outcomes from these demonstra-
tions and other SSA demonstration efforts (some of which were canceled before
completion), the GAO noted that these demonstrations were limited in scope and did not
substantively inform policy development (GAO 2004). While not summarized above, the
GAO report also critiqued several other SSA non-random assignment evaluations, many
of which struggled to meet participation targets or were canceled due to administrative
issues.
Although these four demonstrations did not result in caseload reductions, the evalu-
ation findings did provide information that was used to plan future delivery of services.
The STETS and TETD evaluations provided information on the effectiveness of providing
transitional supports to youth with disabilities in more integrated settings that informed
Wittenburg et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2013, 2:4 Page 11 of 25
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/4the development of later demonstrations such as the Youth Transition Demonstration
(described below). Additionally, the SPI evaluation findings informed other SSA ser-
vice delivery efforts, including a description for a national position to provide benefits
counseling supports to all SSDI and SSI beneficiaries that were implemented after SPI
(GAO 2008).2. SSA demonstrations and employment programs following Ticket Act
Following the passage of the Ticket Act, SSA launched several major employment dem-
onstration projects and programs. Some focused on the provision of employment sup-
ports, whereas others focused on the disability determination processes and the
provision of health benefits. In designing these demonstration projects, SSA was inter-
ested in testing how the interventions influence the multiple work barriers faced by the
heterogeneous SSDI and SSI beneficiary populations. Consequently, some interventions
targeted rehabilitation supports (e.g., Ticket), whereas others attempted to provide enhanced
work incentives and/or most customized supports to specific subgroups, such as those with
psychiatric impairments and youth with disabilities. Although SSA implemented several
projects after the Ticket to Work Act, we limit our review to the Ticket to Work program
and three demonstrations that have a completed evaluation and included intervention
components with a strong emphasis on work.
In Table 2, we describe three major demonstrations and the TTW program that was
implemented following the Ticket Act.12 As in Table 1, Table 2 includes a detailed summary
of the evaluation design, intervention components, target population, and key impact find-
ings related to employment, earnings, and program participation. Below, we describe each
of these three demonstrations and the TTW program in more detail.
In 1999, policymakers implemented the Ticket to Work program, which provides
beneficiaries with more vendor choices for obtaining employment services and offers
employment-support service providers new financial incentives to serve beneficiaries
effectively. Specifically, TTW introduced a new, outcome-based financing system for
employment service providers in both the public and private sectors. SSI and SSDI
claimants who have been given tickets by SSA can select from an array of SSA-
approved public and private providers, referred to as employment networks. Providers can
decide whether or not to accept tickets from those seeking their services and determine,
in consultation with the ticketholder, the types of services to be delivered. TTW was
phased in nationally during three stages from 2002 through 2004.
During each stage, SSA sent notifications to all SSDI and SSI beneficiaries who were
eligible for the program—which included the vast majority of caseload participants
residing in specific groups of states.13
The TTW evaluation assessed impacts using a quasi-experimental approach that
exploited variation in the implementation of TTW across states and over time. After
controlling for characteristics in the pre-rollout year, Stapleton et al. (2008) measured
impacts as the difference in outcomes between TTW-eligible beneficiaries living in
states where TTW had been implemented and eligible beneficiaries who were living in
states where the program had not yet been implemented. The strategy allowed each
source of impact identification—cross-state, pre-post, and within-period cross-person—to
be used in the estimation of impacts.
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Notes: Adapted from Rangarajan et al. (2008). All dollar estimates are adjusted to the year 2012 using the Consumer
Price Index, which is available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (accessed March 25, 2013). We only present impacts that were
statistically significant from zero at the 5 percent level.
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ment and benefits were too small to differentiate from historical trends and there were
only small effects, on service enrollment. Stapleton et al. (2008) found that TTW in-
creased beneficiary use of employment services in 2002 and 2003, the first two rollout
years. However, the increase in service utilization did not appear to produce a corre-
sponding increase in beneficiary earnings or a reduction in benefit payments, as the
variation in these outcomes were too small to differentiate from historical variation.14
The authors noted that impacts for 2004 and later may be larger as participation rates
continue to increase. Nevertheless, analysis of trends suggests that to generate the level
of exits from the SSA disability programs originally envisioned by the authorizing legis-
lation, TTW needs to induce shifts in beneficiary behavior that are much larger than
what has been observed so far.
A major challenge in establishing TTW was creating a new market of service pro-
viders from the private sector. Traditionally, these services had been provided to bene-
ficiaries through state VR agencies, and the hope was that the TTW would offer more
alternatives for obtaining services through private providers. However, even following
the passage of the Ticket Act, the vast majority of participants used their tickets at state
VR agencies, in large part because few providers entered the market, and the ones that
did found the payments from SSA to be limited relative to the costs of serving the few
clients that did bring Tickets to them.
In reviewing the implementation of TTW, GAO (2004) argued that the rush to im-
plement the program created inefficiencies that could have been addressed in a smaller
pilot. GAO claimed that if SSA had tested various components of the TTW program
prior to launching it nationwide, it might have been able to identify problems and de-
velop solutions prior to implementation. GAO also cited the lack of tests involving VR
service-related interventions prior to TTW as a shortcoming in informing the develop-
ment of TTW. In 2008, the TTW program regulations were revised in an attempt to
address initial shortcomings of the program. A primary goal of the revised regulations
was to increase the financial incentives for employment service providers to serve
ticketholders and thereby increase the pool of service providers available to TTW
participants (Altshuler et al. 2011).
The benefits of developing a pilot program prior to a major demonstration are illus-
trated by SSA’s Benefit Offset Pilot Demonstration (BOPD), which was the precursor
to the larger and ongoing Benefit Offset National Demonstration (BOND). BOPD was
implemented in four states (Connecticut, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin) to test the
administrative processes needed for BOND. As in BOND, BOPD provided SSDI bene-
ficiaries with a gradual income benefit offset of $2 for every $1 in earnings above SGA
instead of withdrawing all income benefits for any earnings above SGA, as under
current law. Although all BOPD sites adhered to broad participation and recruitment
requirements, the target population and outreach and recruitment methods varied
considerably by state. Unlike BOND, BOPD only included volunteers.
Weathers and Hemmeter (2011) found mixed employment, earnings, and benefit ef-
fects depending on whether beneficiaries earned above SGA before the demonstration.
Specifically, they found that BOPD had a significant positive impact on earnings for
those earnings below SGA. However, they found that BOPD had a negative effect on
the earnings of those already earning above SGA. The former finding reflects that some
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ticipation, suggesting that the current law causes some beneficiaries to restrict their
earnings. The latter finding indicates that those already earning above SGA might re-
duce their earnings in response to the benefit offset because it allows the beneficiaries
to maintain their overall income level while working fewer hours. The combined effect
of those increasing and those decreasing their earnings in response to the benefit offset
led to a net increase in program costs, as benefit payments increased by over $1,000
per volunteer over the two-year period. Weathers and Hemmeter emphasized that the
findings are for volunteers and therefore do not necessarily imply that BOND will
produce similar findings.
In addition to providing a potential preview of BOND’s impacts, BOPD revealed chal-
lenges in administering the benefit offset that would be eventually used to inform the
administration of the benefit offset under BOND. The initial benefit adjustment and
payment process, which differed across the four BOPD sites, created significant delays
in benefit payments to offset users. The lessons learned during BOPD resulted in the
creation of a centralized payment system for BOND’s benefit offset users. The BOND
project is currently under way in 10 sites across the country.
The final two demonstrations were geared toward subgroups of beneficiaries based
on impairment type (psychiatric disabilities) and age (young adults). To encourage
SSDI beneficiaries with a primary impairment of schizophrenia or affective disorder to
work, SSA conducted the Mental Health Treatment Study (MHTS) from 2006 to 2010.
MHTS provided supported employment (SE) and systemic medication management
services (MMS) to a randomized group of volunteer participants over a 24-month
period. The SE intervention was administered at sites chosen because of their ability to
implement the Individual Placement and Support (IPS) model—the evidence-based SE
model used for the MHTS SE intervention—as well as other behavioral health and SE
services. As will be described in more detail in the next section, the IPS model has
demonstrated repeated success providing services to those with psychiatric impair-
ments. The MMS intervention was composed of two parts: a systemic review of symp-
toms and functioning by an experienced nurse prior to each prescriber visit and an
“algorithmic approach” to MMS that employed diagnosis specific decision trees.
Frey et al. (2011) found that the MHTS improved several employment, earnings, and
health outcomes for treatment group members and that participation rates were generally
strong among those offered services. Frey et al. noted that the strong participation rates
(14 percent of those solicited participated) potentially reflect high unmet demand for these
types of services. After 24 months, 61 percent of those who received MHTS services were
employed, compared with just 40 percent of those who did not receive the services. The
findings from a follow-up survey indicated small monthly earnings impacts of just over
$50, though the average monthly earnings of treatment group members were still quite
low ($148). Compared with control subjects, treatment subjects were more likely to use
both medical and vocational services. The treatment group also reported improvements
in mental health status and quality of life. However, these benefits came at significant
intervention cost, as each treatment group member received $6,986 worth of services each
year. Although the demonstration did not conduct a formal benefit-cost analysis, Frey
et al. (2011) noted that MHTS had impacts in other areas that would be important in
assessing the net benefits of the demonstration. For example, MHTS created important
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drug medication, as well as provided other mental health supports that had impacts
elsewhere, including reduced hospitalizations.
Between 2003 and 2008, SSA initiated a multisite intervention called the Youth
Transition Demonstration (YTD) projects, which provided services to youth between
the ages of 14 to 25 who were receiving SSI or SSDI benefits, or at risk of entering SSI
or SSDI. In total, 10 projects were implemented, but only six have a formal assessment
of impacts. The six sites use a randomized controlled trial evaluation design to assess
outcomes one year and three years after enrollment. The types of services offered to
participants vary by project, but all projects include the following two components: (1)
a core intervention that emphasizes employment as a key outcome and (2) services,
such as intensive employment supports and benefits counseling, that are tailored to
the unique needs of youth who receive SSA disability benefits (Luecking and
Wittenburg 2009).
The one-year follow-up findings from the six random assignment sites indicate that
all interventions led to increased use of employment services, though the intensity of
service utilization varied by implementation phase (Fraker 2013). A key aspect of the
YTD design was the staggered intervention of sites that included the implementation
of three projects in Phase 1 and three more projects in Phase 2. Before the Phase 2 pro-
jects were initiated, an implementation analysis of Phase 1 projects was conducted and
revealed a need for closer monitoring of both the delivery of paid employment services
and participant outcomes. The increased monitoring yielded positive results for Phase
2 projects in comparison to the services delivered in Phase 1 projects—the average
number of hours received for any type of participant service was consistently high for
these projects.
The initial YTD findings indicated a potential relationship between service intensity
and employment impacts. Of the four projects that provided the most hours of
services, three had positive impacts on the number of youth who found paying jobs,
and two also had positive impacts on annual earnings. In contrast, the two projects that
provided the fewest hours of services had no impacts on employment and earnings.
The two YTD sites with large impacts are particularly notable given their size and na-
ture of interventions. The Miami-Dade County and West Virginia sites had statistically
significant positive impacts on both paid employment and total earnings during the
year after random assignment. Forty-three percent of the treatment group in West
Virginia was employed, reflecting an impact of 19.1 percentage points. The impact on
mean annual earnings was $524 in that site (relative to control group earnings of
$1,035). In Miami-Dade County, the impacts on paid employment and earnings were
9.4 percentage points and $306, respectively. The only Phase 2 project that did not have
impacts was in Montgomery County (Maryland), which, unlike the other sites, did not
have a target population of SSI or SSDI youth. In the final evaluation report of this site,
Fraker et al. (2012) found that the control group still had access to very strong support
services, which likely contributed to the high employment rates of the control group
(and lack of impacts).
In summary, the post-Ticket Act demonstration projects and programs indicated a
mix of success in promoting employment outcomes. As with the findings for earlier
SSA demonstrations projects, the MHTS and YTD interventions, which offered more
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impacts programs and demonstrations such as TTW and BOPD, which had less indi-
vidually targeted approaches in targeting participants for services.
An important caveat for the interventions described above is that it is too early to
assess long-term impacts that could have important implications for assessing the costs
and benefits of the demonstration. For example, there is a potential that some demon-
strations could produce a net benefit on participant outcomes and spending by other
government agencies, even if there is not a direct reduction on spending for SSDI and
SSI if the demonstrations result in less government spending elsewhere. This issue is
particularly relevant in YTD and MHTS, given that the positive participant outcomes
related to employment and employment service use could lead to other improved long-
term outcomes (such as social engagement), leading to a lower need for future services
or use of expensive supports (e.g., Medicare payments in MHTS or lower incarceration
rates in YTD).CMS’ Demonstration to Maintain Independence and Employment
In an attempt to examine the effectiveness of alternative approaches in providing supports
to people with disabilities to improve their employment outcomes, the Ticket to Work
and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 legislated the test of an initiative that
extends Medicaid coverage to individuals who are at risk of—but may have not yet applied
for—SSA disability benefits. The test of this intervention was named the Demonstration
to Maintain Independence and Employment (DMIE) and was administered by CMS.
The DMIE was a multisite randomized controlled trial designed to examine the effects
of behavioral health, case management, vocational, and other services on economic and
health outcomes of working individuals with potentially disabling behavioral health disor-
ders, including those who were not SSI or SSDI beneficiaries (Table 3). Consistent with
the authorizing legislation, the DMIE’s primary intervention was the provision of health
insurance to populations at risk of receiving SSA disability benefits. All participating states
used random assignment, offered the program to eligible adults 18 to 62 years old who
were working at least part time, and excluded persons who indicated that they had pend-
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supports, and person-centered case management. The general goal of these interventions
was to promote health and reduce long-term reliance on SSDI and SSI. Each of the
four participating states—Kansas, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Texas—developed its own
intervention, target population, and recruitment methods within CMS guidelines. An
important difference across states was that primary disabling conditions varied; Kansas
enrolled individuals with a wide array of conditions, Minnesota and Texas focused on
adults with mental/behavioral health issues, and Hawaii targeted people with diabetes.
The DMIE evaluation found that the intervention’s effects varied by site and were
particularly sensitive to the target population (Whalen et al. 2011). None of the DMIE
projects had an impact on employment and earnings. A major challenge in detecting
employment and earning impacts was that control group members in all sites generally
remained employed (over 90 percent) throughout the demonstration. The DMIE was
associated with a statistically significant reduction of 2.0 percentage points in receipt of
SSA benefits in Texas. The authors noted that the short time frame may have limited
impacts, particularly on SSA disability benefits given that it takes some time to apply
for and become eligible for these benefits.
DMIE is notable because it represented an attempt to target services to people with
disabilities before they entered SSDI or SSI, though the findings reveal the challenges
of identifying a target population at risk for benefits. In all sites, most of the control
group remained employed throughout the demonstration, and the one site that had
impacts on SSDI participation had very low rates of SSDI entry by the control group
(4.0 percent), limiting the potential effect size. If future interventions could more
precisely identify populations at risk for program entry or loss of employment, then
early intervention impacts might be stronger than those reported for DMIE.Other demonstrations
There have been initiatives outside of SSA and CMS to help people with disabilities work.
However, most of these have not been rigorously evaluated (Rangarajan et al. 2008). Conse-
quently, many service providers continue to use more traditional approaches to providing
employment services—especially sheltered and segregated approaches—to people with
intellectual and other severe disabilities, in part because a universally agreed upon set of
best practices for serving this population does not exist (Kregel and Dean 2002).
The one employment intervention that has been rigorously evaluated outside of SSA
and CMS is supported employment programs for people with psychiatric disorders
(including affective, anxiety, and schizophrenia disorders; Table 4). These programs are
voluntary and generally offer a combination of competitive employment and health
services to populations that are recruited through social service agencies.15 During the
1990s, several independent evaluations found significant impacts of supported employ-
ment interventions on employment outcomes of people with psychiatric impairments
(Bond 2004). Each of these evaluations provided a rigorous evaluation of employment
outcomes and included detailed documentation of the services delivered so the findings
could be replicated in other settings. The follow-up period on these studies typically was
one to three years, and sample sizes tended to be small (from less than 50 to over 200).
Bond (2004) summarized 12 randomized controlled studies that compared supported
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11 studies with similar requirements as well as high fidelity to the IPS supported
employment model. A major advantage of the IPS model relative to other models was
that it has been well documented in a practice manual (Becker and Drake 2003).
The supported employment findings in these small-scale studies consistently
showed strong impacts on employment. Bond et al. (2005) found that the average
competitive employment rate was 59 percent for consumers in supported employ-
ment, compared with 21 percent for those not receiving supported employment ser-
vices. In the later studies focusing on the IPS model, Bond et al. (2008) found
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percent for control participants. Bond et al. (2008) also examined four studies that
assessed hours worked, finding that 44 percent of treatment participants were
employed for 20 hours or more a week compared to 14 percent of control participants.
Although the studies provided important information on employment, they tested dif-
ferent types of service models and lacked information on key outcomes, such as
earnings.
To provide a more comprehensive evaluation of alternative supported employment
models in different settings on several outcomes (including earnings), in 1995,
SAMHSA funded the Employment Intervention Demonstration Program (EIDP) in
several cities. A major advantage of EIDP over the previous studies is that it was
structured to provide a detailed comparison across supported employment models,
regions, and subgroups. The study was designed to determine new ways of enhancing
employment opportunities and quality of life for consumers with psychiatric condi-
tions. The treatment groups received services under different supported employment
service models designed specifically for people with psychiatric conditions, including
the IPS model described above, whereas other experimental sites enhanced their ser-
vice model by providing novel features such as developing special connections to
employers. Although the program models varied, all shared common characteristics
of supported employment models, including a focus on integration of clinical and
employment services, availability of ongoing support, development of jobs consistent
with the person’s career ambitions, and a focus on rapid job placement. There were
1,273 participants assigned to treatment and control groups at the EIDP study sites,
and the evaluation tracked outcomes for two years.
As with the supported employment findings of the 1990s, Cook et al. (2005) con-
tinued to find that supported employment models were successful in promoting bet-
ter employment and earnings outcomes for people with psychiatric impairments.
Specifically, Cook et al. (2005) reported that individuals enrolled in supported em-
ployment programs were more likely to be competitively employed than their coun-
terparts (55 versus 34 percent) and work 40 or more hours per month (51 versus 39
percent). Cook et al. (2005) also found that supported employment participants had
higher monthly earnings, though earnings were modest ($122 versus $99 per month).
Although the earnings impacts in these studies were statistically significant and rep-
resented significant increases in monthly income, they were generally not enough to
move people off benefits.
One recurring theme in the supported employment findings that was consistent
with the SSA demonstrations was the importance of customized supports to meet
the needs of the individuals. Specifically, Cook et al. (2005) found models that had a
more integrated set of vocational services and clinical mental health services, such
as medication management and individual therapy, were more effective than models
with low levels of service integration. Participants in the more integrated models
were over twice as likely to be competitively employed and almost one-and-one-half
times as likely to work 40 or more hours per month (Cook and O’Day 2006). They
noted the results confirm the importance of communication between service
providers, integration of mental health and rehabilitation services, and a strong
emphasis on vocational services in meeting employment goals.
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Over the past few decades, the employment interventions for people with disabilities
have experienced mixed success in promoting employment and earnings outcomes and
little success in reducing reliance on SSI and SSDI benefits. The size of employment
and earnings impacts are relatively small in comparison to what might be needed to
eliminate the need for SSDI or SSI benefits (and the associated benefits through Medi-
care and Medicaid). In part, the limited impacts likely reflect that most participants
targeted in these demonstrations receive substantial cash and other supports that are
terminated due to substantive work and must navigate a fragmented system of supports
to access additional services.
Based on existing findings, the strongest interventions appear to customize supports
and target services specifically to younger populations, which is perhaps not surprising
given that younger populations have long-term work potential. For example, the
supported employment and MHTS interventions targeted customized supports to those
with psychiatric impairments and repeatedly generated small, but significant, positive
impacts in a variety of employment settings. Several youth projects, including the
STETS and TETD demonstrations and three ongoing YTD projects, showed strong
employment and earnings impacts, particularly in projects where the supports were
individually customized. Conversely, employment impacts have generally been smaller
for interventions with a broader focus or where the supports did not substantially differ
from existing services. For example, TTW offers an employment-based program to the
majority of SSDI and SSI eligible beneficiaries that—from the beneficiary or private
employment provider perspective—at initial rollout was not radically different from the
supports that were previously available.
Another lesson that these demonstrations illustrate is the importance of testing inter-
vention service delivery prior to full-scale implementation to ensure everything operates
as intended. BOPD and YTD both provide excellent examples of how testing and careful
monitoring of intervention services can lead to improvements in service delivery. Con-
versely, the lack of testing in TTW led to substantial initial implementation problems.
As policymakers continue to develop ideas to promote the employment and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency of people with disabilities, the lessons from past and ongoing
employment demonstrations are providing insights into promising interventions. For
example, findings from YTD and other demonstrations are shaping the development
of the Promoting Readiness of Minors in SSI (PROMISE) intervention, which seeks
to improve the provision and coordination of services to promote better education
and employment outcomes for child SSI beneficiaries.16 However, if policymakers
wish to discover interventions that reduce caseloads as well as improve employment
and earnings outcomes, they will likely need to test more ambitious ideas that
address the major work barriers within the current system.17 Unfortunately, there is
little information on how such major reforms would affect the outcomes of people
with disabilities, though based on the findings of DMIE, they will need a strong
mechanism to identify a target population at risk for benefit receipt. Nonetheless,
the successes identified in this review of intervention options, particularly those
assisting younger beneficiaries, hold promise for designing future approaches.
Perhaps more importantly, the general approach of testing intervention supports to
ensure adequate implementation and interest in participation prior to full-scale
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unintended consequences.Endnotes
1CMS provides administrative oversight for Medicare, which is fully federally funded,
and Medicaid, which uses a mix of federal and state dollars.
2When a state VR agency does not have enough funding, it uses a waiting list
process called order of selection, where cases are prioritized based on their disability
status.
3It is important to note that employment interventions are part of a much broader
literature that examines the work and program participation outcomes of people with
disabilities. The related literature includes assessments of the residual work capacity of
SSDI beneficiaries (Maestas et al. 2011; Von Wachter et al. 2011) factors that influence
general work and program participation trends (Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003), and
dynamic structural models that examine how SSDI beneficiaries’ behavioral outcomes
change in response to different work incentives (Benítez‐Silva et al. 2006, Benítez‐Silva
et al. 2010).
4The Ticket Act also allowed states to establish Medicaid buy-in programs that allow
persons to maintain their medical coverage while working and extended Medicare
coverage for working SSDI beneficiaries.
5For more details, see http://ssa.gov/OP_Home/comp2/F106-170.html (Accessed April
30 2013).
6As will be described, two demonstrations did not exclusively recruit people who had
already enrolled in the SSA disability programs. Project Network targeted a subgroup of
beneficiaries applying for benefits. Additionally, a Youth Transition Demonstration project
at one site targeted youth with disabilities who were not receiving SSI or SSDI benefits.
However, in both cases, the subgroup of people not on the disability rolls represented a
small portion of the demonstration target population.
7Average SSI benefits were reduced by $1,645 over the six-year period after enroll-
ment. Among the subgroup that received SSDI benefits at the time of enrollment, the
statistically significant impact on SSDI receipt was about 11 percent at the end of the
six-year post enrollment period (Decker and Thornton 1995).
8In TETD, there were statistically significant differences in impacts across subgroups
based on the IQs of youth. The estimates suggest that the demonstration was particularly
effective in increasing earnings for the group with the highest IQ scores but ineffective for
groups with low or moderate scores. The estimated impact on earnings for people living
independently at the time of enrollment was very large (189 percent), which possibly
reflects their greater independence or motivation (Decker and Thornton 1995).
9The original SPI projects included 18 projects in 17 states from 1999 to 2004 that
delivered employment-related services to people with disabilities. SSA funded 12 of the 18
state projects, and the Department of Education Rehabilitation Services Administration
(RSA) funded the remaining six. The SSA-funded projects focused on testing new services
for the Social Security claimants with disabilities. The RSA-funded projects focused on
activities aimed at changing the overall system of supports for people with disabilities
(some of whom received other forms of public assistance) and were designed to help them
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targeted high school students with an emphasis on education and employment aspirations
was excluded from the study because the administrative data for the project was not suffi-
cient for measuring impacts on these outcomes.
10Specifically, they tested the feasibility of using propensity score matching in the
non-experimental sites, where the characteristics of treatment group members were
matched to a comparison group using administrative data. To test this method, they
compared findings from the propensity score matching methodology to the random
assignment findings in the four sites that had implemented random assignment.
Presumably, if the propensity score matching method was unbiased, it would produce
results similar to those based on random assignment.
11This problem in finding a non-experimental comparison group illustrates a general
problem in using non-experimental methods to generate impact estimates when volunteer
rates are low (i.e., below 5 percent); namely, participant and nonparticipant characteristics
vary in ways that cannot be observed. Hence, this finding might be important in consider-
ing the applicability of non-experimental designs more generally in other settings where
volunteer rates are low.
12GAO (2008) noted that since 1998, SSA had initiated 14 demonstration projects
that had a wide range of activities. We chose interventions that had an intensive em-
ployment focus and a completed evaluation. At the time of their review, five projects
had been canceled and only four were complete. Of the completed demonstrations,
we only exclude the Accelerated Benefits demonstration, which, although it had an
employment component, had the dominant provision of providing early access to a
health plan to SSDI beneficiaries in the Medicare waiting period. The employment
supports in the Accelerated Benefits demonstration, which were delivered telephon-
ically, were substantially less intensive relative to the employment supports described
in this section.
13The only adult beneficiaries who were ineligible for TTW were (1) those designated as
"medical improvement expected" who had been on the rolls for less than three years and
had not yet had a continuing disability review and (2) former child SSI recipients awaiting
adult redetermination.
14They did find initial small impacts on benefit and earnings outcomes, but in testing
the sensitivity of their results, they found that the small effects were not different from the
effects during the pre-periods when TTW was not available. Hence, they concluded
the effects were too small to differentiate from historical variation.
15According to Wehman and Revell (2005), funding for supported employment ser-
vices typically occurs in two phases: (1) employment services funded by VR and several
other federal and state agencies on a time-limited basis that may include vocational as-
sessment, career planning, job development, job-site training, assistive technology, and
accommodations; and (2) if available, the provision of extended services (for example,
employment supports and case management) to support work performance. Variations
of supported employment models exist, including for people with nonpsychiatric im-
pairments, though they all emphasize the provision of ongoing individualized supports
to meet a competitive employment outcome.
16For more details, see http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/promise.htm (accessed
March 27, 2013).
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/417For example, Burkhauser and Daly (2011) suggest using experience rating to encour-
age employer accommodations of disability. Autor and Duggan (2010) suggest using a
mandatory short-term disability insurance program. Mann and Stapleton (2012) suggest
testing an approach using a disability support administrator to address the fragmentations
in the existing system. Finally, Liebman and Smalligan (2013) suggest testing several op-
tions and reforms to develop an evidence based approach to reforming disability policy.
Stapleton and Wittenburg (2011) provides a review of several of the aforementioned
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